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Abstract
We compare the welfare states and taxation regimes of the two largest economies in the world,
China and the United States, from 1992 to 2017. We begin with a comparison of each country’s
net social wage—that is, the difference between total benefits received by and taxes paid by
labor—using two established methods. While the net social wage in the two countries exhibited
similar trends, the increasing net social wage has distinctly different implications in the two
countries due to their specific historical trajectories in the neoliberal era. In the US, the
increasing net social wage reflects an ambivalent and reluctant response to workers’ social
reproduction. In China, it reflects institutional changes in the welfare state, which we interpret as
the Chinese state’s attempt to resolve the social-reproduction crisis caused by neoliberal reforms
of the 1990s.
Keywords: China, United States, welfare state, taxation, social wage
JEL codes:
H5 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies;
P520 Comparative Studies of Particular Economies;
B5 Current Heterodox Approaches
1. Introduction

The welfare states of the two largest economies in the world, the United States and China,
emerged in remarkably different historical and political contexts. In the US, the welfare state
emerged as part of New Deal reforms meant to address poverty and inequality during the Great
Depression in the 1930s. The American Civil Rights movement led to the creation of more social
programs and policies during the Great Society era of the 1960s and early 1970s. Tensions
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related to race, gender, and assumptions about the ‘deserving poor’ played a major role in the
backlash against the expansion of the US welfare state, leading to a comprehensive reform in the
1990s under President Clinton. In China, the welfare state emerged as an integral part of the
central planning system that existed from 1949 to 1977. Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s
gradually but significantly re-shaped the welfare system by weakening rural collectives and
urban public firms, which had played a crucial role in the provision of welfare under the central
planning system. Since the mid-2000s, a number of institutional changes have been reinstated in
an effort to rebuild the welfare system in China.

In this paper, we compare these welfare states and taxation regimes from 1992 to 2017. We
choose the year 1992 as the starting point because, since 1992, China has established a market
economy, which has induced not only the commodification of labor power but also significant
changes in welfare institutions. Thus, there is basic comparability between the two countries over
the post-1992 period.

We use an empirical method known as the net social wage (NSW) approach, which measures the
difference between total labor benefits and total labor taxation. Based on a comparison of each
country’s redistributive policy, we ask if they responded to the crisis of neoliberalism in similar
ways. In general, the neoliberal era has not amounted to a full retrenchment of the state. Rather,
neoliberalism typically rests on a policy mix in which the state plays an active role in creating
and promoting markets through deregulation, free trade, and weakened labor and social
protections. While it is widely accepted that the US has pursued neoliberal policies, the question
of neoliberalism in China is more controversial (Weber 2018; Weber 2020). There are

2

undoubtedly features of neoliberalism in China, including the mass privatization of public firms
and commodification of labor power in the 1990s (Qi and Li 2019); however, there are also
policies against neoliberalism, especially in the strong regulation of financial sectors (Lo 2016;
Weber 2018; Weber 2020). Considering these mixed observations, more solid empirical
evidence from a comparative perspective is needed in order to evaluate the relationship between
neoliberalism and social welfare policy in China.

This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it is the only paper to
compare the welfare state and taxation regimes of the US and China using the NSW approach for
this time period, and the only paper to publish data on the Chinese NSW in a Western journal.3
Second, given that the taxation system in China relies more on indirect taxes than its US
counterpart, this comparison further develops and explores the debate within the NSW literature
over the proper methodological treatment of indirect taxes. Third, the paper proposes a novel
NSW-inspired method that makes use of additional data on rural-urban divisions within China.
Fourth, our paper further compares the response in each country to the crisis of neoliberalism,
employing a historical lens.

While both China and the US show an increasing NSW in recent years, our analysis suggests this
trend has different implications in each country. In the US, the increasing NSW reflects an
ambivalent and reluctant response to the status of workers’ social reproduction, whereas in

Liu Fengyi and Liu Zijia (2019) compared net social wages in China and OECD countries from 1999 to 2015 in the
Chinese journal, China Review of Political Economy.
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China, it reflects institutional changes in the welfare state, with which the Chinese state has
attempted to resolve the social-reproduction crisis caused by the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s.

The paper has the following structure. The next section reviews the relevant literature that
compares the US and China in terms of social expenditures and taxation. In the third section, we
present two distinct methods of estimating the net social wage and discuss their different
treatment of indirect taxes. The fourth and fifth sections discuss the data and results. The sixth
section discusses the findings comparatively. The final section offers concluding remarks about
the heterogeneity and convergence of welfare states in the neoliberal era.

2. Literature Review: Are the Welfare States of China and the US Comparable?

As the two largest economies in the world, the US and China exhibit both differences and
similarities in regard to stages of development and historical trajectories. As Table 1 shows,
despite its rapid growth over the past four decades, China was much less developed than the US
during this period. In 2016, the real GDP per capita in China was 13 percent of the US per capita
real GDP; the urbanization rate in China was 69 percent that of the US. The two countries
exhibited significantly different structures of aggregate demand: China had a higher reliance on
investment and exports than the US. Nevertheless, government expenditure as a share of GDP
was similar in both countries in 2016.

[Insert Table 1 here.]
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Like many countries throughout the world, both China and the US have experienced increased
income inequality since the 1990s, making inequality a major political issue in both countries
(Creed and Liu 2014, 48). As Table 1 shows, both China and the US exhibited higher
inequality—revealed by higher top income shares and lower labor income shares—and a greater
participation in globalization, both of which are crucial changes associated with neoliberalism.
Globalization and the trade relationship between the two countries have been cited as major
contributors to growing inequality in both countries—in China between coastal areas with
manufacturing jobs and inner regions, and in the US as a result of the loss of manufacturing jobs
due to outsourcing and downward pressure on low-wage employment in general (Creed and Liu
2014, 50–52).

In recent years comparative studies of the welfare states of China and the US that use the
National Transfer Accounts (NTA) method have emerged. The primary concern of the NTA
method is to assess the influence of demographic shifts—in particular population age structure—
on national economies (Mason and Lee 2011, 3). The method is based on an accounting identity
in which the ‘lifecycle deficit’ is equal to the net flows of public and private transfers and
reallocations (Mason and Lee 2011, 11). Based on age-specific labor income and consumption
data, the NTA method can be used to construct ‘economic support ratios’ and ‘fiscal support
ratios.’ Interestingly, both countries had an economic support ratio of 0.90 in 2000, and a fiscal
support ratio of 1.0 in 2010. Both China and the US diverge from other countries studied using
the NTA method. China is considered an anomalous case in that it has relatively low fertility and
children’s consumption and overall consumption are both low (Mason and Lee 2011, 17). In
most countries a decline in fertility has resulted in an increase in the investment in children’s
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human capital, but this has not been the case in China (Li, Chen, and Jiang 2011, 414). The US is
unusual because the elderly have higher consumption and labor income than any other country
studied with this method (Lee, Donehower, and Miller 2011, 313).

While China and the US have different welfare state programs and policies, both countries have
experienced retrenchment of the welfare state. Creed and Liu (2014) argue that the US and China
have experienced an ‘unwinding’ of the social contract, which has increased economic disparity.
While the countries experienced this phenomenon in roughly the same time period, the changes
have been different—in the US the unwinding has been about undermining New Deal and Great
Society era protections in the 1980s and 1990s, while in China the unwinding has included
market reforms and opening up the economy beginning in 1978 (Creed and Liu 2014, 39).

3. Methods

3.1 Net Social Wage Approach, Traditional Method (NSW1)

The traditional net social wage method (NSW1) was first developed by Shaikh and Tonak (1987,
2000), but has since been applied to a number of countries.4 The net social wage (NSW) is the
sum of all social expenditures that benefit labor (E), minus the sum of all taxes paid by labor (T):

𝑁𝑆𝑊$ = 𝐸 − 𝑇

4

(1)

See Moos (2019) for a full literature review on the net social wage.
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In this method, social expenditures attributed to labor consist of programs that benefit labor
entirely (E1) and social benefits that partially benefit labor (E2). E1 consists of direct payments
and transfers, such as pensions, income support, public health insurance, and housing. E2 consists
of spending that benefits both labor and capital, such as education, funding for hospitals, energy,
transportation, natural resources, and recreation. To estimate how much of E2 is attributed to
labor, we multiply it by the labor share (LS):

𝐸 = 𝐸$ + 𝐸* ∗ 𝐿𝑆

(2)

Similarly, in the traditional NSW1 approach, taxes are also divided into two groups: T1, which is
attributed entirely to labor, and T2, which is attributed partially to labor and partially to capital.
T1 consists of taxes associated with the cost of hiring workers, such as employee and employer
contributions to social insurance. T2 consists of income taxes, personal property taxes, motor
vehicle taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes and fines. To estimate how much of T2 is paid by
labor, it is multiplied by the labor share (LS):

𝑇 = 𝑇$ + 𝑇* ∗ 𝐿𝑆

(3)

3.2 Net Social Wage Approach, Indirect Taxes Method (NSW2)

Maniatis (2014) determined that researchers who employ the net social wage approach do not all
use the method originally formulated by Shaikh and Tonak. Another net social wage method,
NSW2, includes a third category of taxes, T3, which is the sum of indirect taxes. In this method,
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T3 is multiplied by the labor share to estimate how much of indirect taxes can be attributed to
labor.

𝑁𝑆𝑊* = 𝐸$ + 𝐸* ∗ 𝐿𝑆 − (𝑇$ + 𝑇* ∗ 𝐿𝑆 + 𝑇. ∗ 𝐿𝑆)

(4)

Using the NSW2 method, Maniatis (2003) found that between 1958 and 1995, the Greek net
social wage was approximately zero, implying that there was no meaningful state redistribution
to labor. An earlier study published by Akram-Lodhi (1996) found that between 1970 and 1990,
the UK net tax—the inverse of the net social wage—was positive, meaning that workers paid
more in taxes than they received in benefits.

The debate over whether or not to include indirect taxes in calculating the net social wage is
ongoing. The traditional NSW1 was designed as an accounting method based on Marxian
analytical categories. It does not include a formal model of the economy, which some, including
Shaikh and Tonak, argue is required to properly estimate who pays indirect taxes (see Moos
2019, 584). Whether or not multiplying T3 by the labor share is an appropriate method for
imputing labor’s share of indirect taxes remains unanswered. According to neoclassical theory,
tax incidence cannot be determined by simply the statutory burden but instead is determined by
price elasticity of demand. Those with inelastic supply or demand will end up paying the taxes,
and those who have elastic supply or demand can avoid paying the taxes. Policy models typically
use neoclassical assumptions and utilize consumer spending data to estimate elasticities of
demand.
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For our purposes, it is useful to calculate both NSW1 and NSW2. They produce dramatically
different results, adding layers of complexity to our comparative analysis. Indirect taxes play an
important role in financing social expenditures, particularly at the state and local level in the US,
and even more so at the central, provincial, and local levels in China.

Our interpretation of the difference between NSW1 and NSW2 is based on social relations rather
than demand elasticities. In practice, taxation has both income effects and price effects, both of
which can affect the distribution between capital and labor. Income effects refer to the effects of
taxation on the amount of value added and employment. For instance, an income tax may
encourage capital flight, reducing domestic job opportunities, and thus repressing the real wage
level for workers. By contrast, price effects of taxation impact distribution through changing
prices of goods relative to nominal wages. For instance, an indirect tax may cause an increase in
the price of consumption goods, reducing the real wage level for workers.

The NSW is an accounting method that reveals the status quo of redistributive policies: it is not
meant to investigate the income effects of taxation. Nevertheless, it is necessary for this approach
to investigate the price effects of taxation, because they determine whether the taxes are
ultimately paid with surplus value or variable capital.

To illustrate the price effects of taxation, suppose (Y) is the net value added of an economy,
which is the sum of labor income (W) and capital income (Π).

𝑌 =𝑊+Π

(5)
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Let y be the real value added per capita, (w) be the real wage per worker, (p) the price level, and
(L) the employment. Net value added, labor income, and capital income can be written as:

𝑌 = 𝑝𝑦

(6)

𝑊 = 𝑤𝑝𝐿

(7)

Π = 𝜋𝑝𝐿

(8)

Suppose there is an indirect tax 𝜏. We use subscript 0 and 1 to represent variables before and
after the indirect tax is imposed. After the tax is imposed, there is

𝑝$ 𝑦 = 𝜏 + 𝑤$ 𝑝$ 𝐿 + 𝜋$ 𝑝$ 𝐿

(9)

We do not consider the income effects of the indirect tax; thus the real value added and
employment are both constant. Using Eqs. (7) and (8), the indirect tax can be rewritten as:

𝜏 = 𝑝$ 𝐿(𝑤7 − 𝑤$ ) + 𝑝$ 𝐿(𝜋7 − 𝜋$ )

(10)

Thus, the indirect tax can be decomposed into two parts, the first associated with the decrease in
the real wage, and the second with the decrease in the real profits. This decomposition shows that
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tax incidence depends on the social relations between employers and employees that regulate
real wages and real profits. Thus, we provide a social-relation-based interpretation of the tax
incidence, which is distinct from the neoclassical market-based interpretation.

Our interpretation reveals that, theoretically, there are many ways to determine tax incidence,
which is contingent on the social relations between employers and employees. One possible
scenario is that employers use a constant real wage to induce an optimal labor effort, which is
consistent with the labor extraction model (Bowles 1985). In this scenario, the indirect tax is
ultimately paid by capital through a reduction of profits. Another scenario is that employers have
sufficient bargaining power over employees to maintain constant real profits and make
employees bear the reduction in real wages. Actual scenarios are likely to lie between these two
extreme cases. We thus provide a rationale for using the labor share to decompose tax incidence.
Given that the labor share can be seen as an index of employees’ bargaining power, it is
reasonable to assume that the tax incidence of labor is the product of total indirect taxes and the
labor share.

3.3 Social-Group-Based Net Social Wage Approach (NSW1R, NSW1U, NSW2R, and NSW2U)

Another innovation of our paper is to apply the NSW approach to social groups in China. We
focus on two major social groups, urban workers and rural workers—peasants who engage in
household farming and have access to a small plot of collectively owned land—which together
comprise what we call ‘labor’ in the context of China. Despite rapid urbanization in the past
three decades, China is still a dual economy, with over 43 percent of the population living in
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rural areas. This is more than double the percentage of the US population living in rural areas,
approximately 19 percent in 2016 (see Table 1). China also has a large urban floating population
consisting of migrant workers from rural areas. While these migrant workers are categorized as
urban workers, their households tend to be semi-proletarianized because their family members
participate in household farming in rural areas. Focusing on these social groups and dividing
Chinese labor into urban and rural workers may reveal more nuanced aspects of the welfare state.

Thus, we propose four new measures of the net social wage. NSW1R and NSW1U are the net
social wages for rural workers and urban workers, respectively, both of which are based on
NSW1. For NSW1R, we only consider fiscal expenditures that benefit rural workers and taxes
paid by rural workers. NSW1U is equal to the difference between NSW1 and NSW1R. Similarly,
NSW2R and NSW2U are measures based on NSW2.

𝑁𝑆𝑊$8 = 𝐸$8 + 𝐸*8 ∗ 𝐿𝑆8 − (𝑇$8 + 𝑇*8 ∗ 𝐿𝑆8 )

(11)

𝑁𝑆𝑊$9 = 𝑁𝑆𝑊$ − 𝑁𝑆𝑊$8

(12)

𝑁𝑆𝑊*8 = 𝐸$8 + 𝐸*8 ∗ 𝐿𝑆8 − (𝑇$8 + 𝑇*8 ∗ 𝐿𝑆8 + 𝑇.8 ∗ 𝐿𝑆8 )

(13)

𝑁𝑆𝑊*9 = 𝑁𝑆𝑊* − 𝑁𝑆𝑊*8

(14)

E1R represents social expenditures that entirely benefit rural workers: fiscal expenditures on rural
social insurances, rural education and health care, benefits for families under the poverty line,
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and agricultural infrastructures. E2R represents social expenditures that partially benefit rural
workers. LSR is the share of rural workers’ income (household farming income) in the net
national income. We use LSR to calculate the amount in E2R that benefits rural workers.
Similarly, T1R is the taxes attributed entirely to rural workers. T2R is the taxes attributed partially
to rural workers. In China, rural workers do not pay any income tax or property tax, in most
cases. Taxes associated with agriculture also play a minor role in China’s total tax revenue. The
Chinese government has cancelled all kinds of agricultural taxes since 2006. Thus, T1R became
zero after 2006; T2R was always zero over this period. Finally, we use LSR to proxy the share of
the taxes in T3R that are attributed to rural workers.

4. Data

The data for calculating the US net social wage is introduced in detail by Moos (2019). We use
the same data sources and methods to extend the time series to 2017. The data for calculating
China’s net social wage is from the official publications of the National Bureau of Statistics. The
basic data source is the Flow of Funds Accounts data. We integrate this data with the official
data on taxes and fiscal expenditures from China Statistical Yearbooks and China Financial
Yearbooks, which are official publications of the National Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry
of Finance, respectively. Table 2 presents the categories we use for each country and their data
sources.

[Insert Table 2 here.]
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It is worth mentioning the few caveats in the data. First of all, there was a change in the
categories of China’s fiscal expenditures in 2007; moreover, the official sources provide no
clarification about this change. As we will see later in the paper, 2007 was a crucial year in the
dynamics of China’s net social wage; thus we have to insulate the impact of changes in statistical
criteria. To this end, we have compared data from different sources to make sure that the data
prior to and after 2007 are sufficiently consistent. We have also conducted robustness checks by
slightly inflating or deflating the data before 2007, finding that the main conclusions of this
paper still hold.

Another caveat is that China’s data sources about fiscal expenditures are not as detailed as their
US counterparts. It is ambiguous how much a Chinese fiscal category lacking detailed
information is relevant to social reproduction. ‘Environment protection costs’ and ‘Costs of
Urban and Rural Community Affairs’ are two examples. Without detailed information, we treat
‘Environment Protection Costs’ as partially benefiting labor and ‘Costs of Urban and Rural
Community Affairs’ as entirely benefiting labor, acknowledging the possibility that this
treatment might cause an overestimation of China's net social wage.

5. Results

Figs. 1–4 present the main results of the net social wage calculation. All the measures of the net
social wage and its components are normalized by nominal GDP. Fig. 1 compares the traditional
measure (NSW1) and the measure considering indirect taxes (NSW2) in both countries. First of
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all, the higher reliance of China's taxation system on indirect taxes is revealed in the much larger
gap between NSW1 and NSW2 in China than in the US.

[Insert Fig. 1 here.]

Fig. 2 shows the components that are used in the calculation of China’s net social wage. Here we
see that T3 is the greatest contributor to the taxation subtracted from China’s NSW. Fig. 3
demonstrates the opposite for the US: of the three categories of taxation, T3 contributes the least
to overall revenue. For this reason, we maintain that while the NSW1 may be a useful measure
for the US—as it does not exclude the most important category of taxation—it is much less
useful for countries such as China (or many other developing nations) that rely much more on
indirect taxation.

[Insert Fig. 2 here.]

[Insert Fig. 3 here.]

Regarding the levels illustrated in Fig. 1, NSW1 reveals a positive net social wage in both the US
and China over the whole period, with the exception of 2001 in the United States. The NSW1 in
China was significantly higher than that in the US over the whole period. One relatively
straightforward interpretation of this result is that, based on the NSW1, redistributive policy was
more generous in China than in the US during this period. However, we urge caution over this
interpretation. While the NSW1 is the ‘traditional’ measure, we conclude that it is inappropriate
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to assess the net social wage in China using this method alone, as it does not adequately capture
the main source of government revenue. Furthermore, as discussed in section 3.2, we can
understand the NSW2 from the perspective of social relations—rather than demand elasticities—
making it theoretically compatible with our empirical political economy analysis. For these
reasons, we favor the NSW2 as a basis for comparing the net effect of redistributive policy in the
US and China.

Despite the two countries’ significant differences in levels of economic development and
approaches to social policy, their NSW2 was remarkably similar from 1992 to 2017. The NSW2
was negative in the US from 1992 to 2007 and in China from 1992 to 2011. This means that for
the majority of the years in our series, workers paid more in taxes—when indirect taxes are
included—than they received in benefits. Starting in 2008 in the US and 2012 in China, the
NSW2 increased and become positive, with a peak in 2010 for the US and a peak in 2015 for
China. The trend of an increasing net social wage in the US has been explained by Moos (2019)
as a result of a number of cyclical, structural, and secular factors—including automatic
stabilizers in the Great Recession, an aging population, healthcare inflation, a greater reliance on
tax expenditures, and increased vulnerability of US workers in the neoliberal era. For that reason,
we do not interpret the results of a higher NSW2 in the US from 2002 to 2017 to mean that US
workers are faring better than their Chinese counterparts.

The net social wage in China exhibited fewer cyclical fluctuations than the US NSW. The
difference in cyclicality is a result of the different patterns of macro dynamics in the two
countries. Economic growth was more stable in China than in the US, thanks to the Chinese
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government’s active regulation of the macroeconomy and the state-owned enterprises’ role in the
stabilization of investments.

Both countries also exhibited structural changes. The US witnessed a rise in the net social wage
at the turn of the century; by contrast, while the net social wage in China slightly declined from
1992 to the mid-2000s, the post-2007 period witnessed a steep rise in the net social wage. Figs. 2
and 3 show that in both countries this rise was mainly associated with a consistent increase in
social expenditures entirely benefiting labor.

In the case of China, the growth of E1 suggests that there was a reorientation of distributive
policies around 2007-2008, after a 15-year-long period influenced by neoliberalism. We argue
that the reorientation was a result of a response to a social-reproduction crisis, which aimed at reembedding social reproduction in a new set of social institutions.5

Since the mid-2000s, the Chinese government has implemented a series of distributive policies to
reestablish a welfare state and resolve the social-reproduction crisis. These policies include the
cancellation of agricultural taxes (2006), the establishment of a social insurance system for rural
residents—medical insurance started in 2003, old-age insurance started in 2009—and a social
insurance system for urban residents who are not in the labor force (2011). The Chinese
government has also promoted participation in the social security system meant to cover urban

China faced a social-reproduction crisis from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s that took place in both urban and rural
areas and was mainly a result of neoliberal reforms. In 1992, in the context of the collapse of the former socialist block,
China’s leadership accelerated marketization reform to pursue economic growth as a kind of political legitimacy. Major
reforms during the 1990s were built upon neoliberal ideologies asserting that unregulated markets and private property
are the key to economic efficiency. These reforms led to a massive privatization of China's state-owned enterprises, an
increase in urban unemployment, informalization of jobs, and a significant increase in inequality.

5
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employees and a consistent growth of subsidies to urban low-income families. The recent
poverty-alleviation movement is to a large extent a continuation of this reorientation. In addition,
local governments in China have intervened in the primary distribution by consistently raising
minimum wages.6 Notably, the reorientation of China's welfare state happened slightly earlier
than the global financial and economic crisis. Apparently, the crisis was not a cause of the
reorientation; nevertheless, it contributed to the continuation of the re-orientation because it
demonstrated the consequences of neoliberal policies to China's policy makers.

Figs. 4 and 5 present the net social wage for the rural workers group and the urban workers
group in China, respectively. The NSW1U was at a higher level—between 2.5 and 7.3 percent of
GDP—than the NSW1R, which was between 1.6 and 5.4 percent of GDP during the same period.
Interestingly, the opposite trend is displayed for the NSW2. In this case rural Chinese workers
received positive redistribution beginning in 2001—albeit still less than 1 percent of GDP until
2008—reaching a high of 4 percent of GDP in 2015 and 2016. The NSW2U, on the other hand,
demonstrates that urban Chinese workers paid more in taxes than they received in benefits during
the entire period. This is the result of the higher indirect taxes paid by Chinese workers in urban
areas. As shown in Figs. 4 and 5, this reorientation of policy in China—leading to an increase in
the net social wage—occurred at the turn of the century for rural workers, while it occurred

The Chinese leadership proposed concepts such as ‘Harmonious Society’ and ‘Common Prosperity’ as the ideologies that
policy makers should fulfill; however, these ideological concepts reflected the state’s awareness of the contradictions
caused by the social-reproduction crisis. The privatization movement instigated social unrest among urban workers,
which could be observed even in the late 2000s. The legitimacy of reforms was challenged by the huge inequality between
private capital owners and laid-off workers. Many studies have documented incidents of labor unrest associated with
privatization. Meanwhile, the underdevelopment of the rural economy stimulated labor outflows, which imposed threats
to agricultural production. Grain production stagnated in the late 1990s for the first time since the decollectivization
reform was launched. The concern of rural development and agricultural production was the crucial factor that brought
about the redistributive policies benefiting China’s rural workers and residents.
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around 2007-2008 for urban workers. Fig. 4 demonstrates the increasing benefits to rural
workers in the form of old-age pensions and medical benefits, as well as the cancellation of
taxes. Fig. 5 reflects more modest increases in net redistributive spending to urban workers in
China.

Policy changes in 21st-century China were meant to address the failure of the reforms of the
1980s and 1990s to provide adequate social protection for urban or rural workers. In urban areas,
Danwei-based welfare collapsed with the fall of former state-owned enterprises and workers'
communities.7 The reforms in the 1990s destroyed the former welfare state without establishing a
new one, which jeopardized the social reproduction of urban workers. The decollectivization of
the rural economy in the 1980s also demolished the local basis for the collective provision of
welfare, although the average income of rural households rapidly increased in the 1990s because
the governments allowed rural workers to work in cities, opening more urban jobs to rural
workers. However, the vast majority of rural workers had no access to social insurances, either in
cities or in the countryside. For this reason, rural households without a member participating in
the formal labor force tended to encounter difficulties in social reproduction prior to reforms in
the 2000s.

[Insert Fig. 4 here.]

[Insert Fig. 5 here.]

Under the state-socialist regime before the 1990s, urban workers had access to all kinds of benefits provided by the
danwei (unit) where they worked. A danwei could be a government department, a government-funded institution (such as
a school or hospital), a state-owned enterprise, or a collective-owned enterprise.

7
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In the US, the growth of the E1 category reflects a combination of cyclical, structural, and
secular changes, such as an aging population and healthcare inflation (Moos 2019). Growth in
US social spending is also the result of more low-income workers qualifying for income support
due to the expansion of low-wage jobs without employer-based benefits, and the increase in
economic instability—both the result of neoliberal policies that favor the interests of capital over
labor.

Policy changes that increased the US net social wage during this period were made within the
context of a strengthened commitment to neoliberalism. In 1993, there were expansions to public
programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a refundable tax credit that subsidizes
low-wage employment, and investments in Head Start, the preschool program for low-income
children. These programs were a boon both to low-income families with children—including
those headed by single mothers—and employers hoping to employ women in low-wage jobs.
President Clinton’s notorious ‘welfare reform’ in 1996 made severe cuts to cash assistance
programs and gave states greater discretion on social policy. However, there were also
expansions of health insurance for low-income children under the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP) a year later. US policy changes in the early 21st century also contributed to the
rise in spending on E1, including the Medicare Modernization Act of 1993 (which went into
effect in 2006) under President George W. Bush, which expanded coverage for prescription
drugs under Medicare without allowing the federal government to negotiate drug prices with
pharmaceutical companies. In response to the Great Recession, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 included substantial social spending and tax cuts. Finally, the
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 was a major piece of social
legislation during this time, and benefited private health insurance companies as much as it did
Americans seeking health coverage. Coupled with tax cuts that reduced revenue—mostly
benefiting corporations and the wealthy, but also reducing taxes for those with more modest
incomes—US neoliberal policy has led to an increased net social wage.

6. Discussion

How do we interpret the rising trend of the net social wage in both countries? Does it imply there
is a common departure from neoliberalism in the top two largest economies of the world? Our
analysis suggests that this seemingly common trend has distinct implications in the two
countries. Moos (2019) has argued that the positive net social wage in the US is evidence of the
decline in conditions for the working class because it was the result of cyclical and structural
threats to social reproduction. Following this logic, we do not assume that rural Chinese workers
are faring better than their urban counterparts, although our analysis using the rural-urbanspecific NSW2 approach has revealed greater net redistribution to the former than to the latter.

In the case of the US, the net social wage has increased as the result of cyclical, structural, and
secular changes in the US economy that have occurred in the context of a decrease in workers’
bargaining power and an increase in economic instability—both consequences of neoliberalism.
By contrast, the increase in the net social wage in China represents a systematic rebuilding of
social reproduction following policy failures in the 1980s and 1990s that undermined social
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protection (Wang 2008). In the US, we interpret the rise in the net social wage to be a reluctant
response to the poor status of social reproduction. In China, the rebuilding of social protection
following the retreat in the 1980s and 1990s is thought by Shen, Wang, and Cai to be
‘unambiguous’—even in the context of a highly unequal society (2018, 138). Given the stark
differences in the political systems in each country—one-party rule under the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the two-party system of Democrats and Republicans in the United
States—it is not surprising that the former would exhibit a more coordinated and the latter a
more ambivalent reaction to the failures of neoliberalism.

Our interpretation of the meaning of a rising net social wage in both the US and China is
influenced by the conditions of workers in each country. China’s working class has been gaining
power since the mid-2000s, a shift associated with factors such as rapid economic growth, a
shrinking reserve army of labor, and various pro-labor policies. Along with the rise in the net
social wage in China, there was consistent and rapid wage growth for both urban and rural
workers over the same period. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), from
2006 to 2017 China experienced the most rapid wage growth in the world (ILO 2018). In China,
the labor share (in the primary distribution) recovered from the historical trough in 2008, which
ended a 14-year-long decline (Qi 2014). In the US, wages have stagnated since the 1970s, and
the labor share has been in steady decline since the second half of the 20th century.

The funding for each welfare regime shows distinct characteristics, adding complexity to our
analysis of the net redistributive effect of each country’s taxation and social policy regimes.
Indirect taxes are largely regarded as a regressive form of taxation, as every consumer—
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regardless of income—will pay the same taxation rate (Decoster et al. 2010). This means that
funding for China’s welfare state depends on a system of taxation that unduly burdens lowincome populations. According to Wang (2017), the reliance on indirect taxes such as a Value
Added Tax (VAT) was designed to depoliticize public finance and obscure the heavy tax burdens
imposed on low-income consumers. China’s tax system ‘struck implicit deals with the wealthy
who gained disproportionally from China’s economic liberalization’ (Wang 2017, 196). The US
has a more progressive taxation system than is commonly assumed—as income tax rates increase
with earnings—however, that does not mean that the underlying system achieves progressive
ends. Neoliberal rhetoric and a long history of racism have successfully undermined support for
social spending in the US, leaving the US tax code to play a major role in redistribution (Steinmo
2010). The tax system in the US plays a role in subsidizing low-wage work, middle-class
consumption and savings, as well as increasing economic inequality by continually cutting taxes
for the wealthy and corporations. While distinctly different systems, neither the US nor China
can boost tax codes that curb economic inequality or favor the most disadvantaged.

It is worth noting that the distinct features of China’s welfare state do not mean that China is
exceptional. State-led redistribution has been favorable to labor, although this redistribution
might be favorable to capital in the long run, by supporting social reproduction and social
stability. Economic slowdown in recent years may further complicate this issue. Thus, there is an
unstable balance between capital and labor, which has to be cautiously maintained by the
Chinese state. Taking a longer historical view, one may find that the Reform era gained support
from below in its early stage, by transferring income from the state to urban and rural workers;
however, this early trend was reversed by the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. From a historical
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perspective, the reorientation in the mid-2000s may be seen as a turning point of a long-wave
movement that emerges from China’s political economic context. Where this long-wave
movement leads depends on the political economic context in the future.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the increase in the US net social wage that began around the
turn of the century occurred when China joined the WTO and Sino-US trade rapidly expanded.
The neoliberal transition in the US has created poverty, unemployment, and inequality since the
end of the 1970s, thus increasing the need for social spending and tax expenditures for social
reproduction—despite neoliberal rhetoric that workers should depend only on their earned
income. Satisfying these needs is crucial for maintaining social stability, even in the neoliberal
context. Nevertheless, how much welfare expenditures the US state can sustain depends on its
fiscal capacity. China has played a role of relieving the tensions between the consequences of
neoliberalism and social reproduction in the US, for several reasons. First, China’s cheap exports
have lowered the cost of living for US households, reducing the burden of social reproduction for
both labor and the state. Second, US dollars held by Chinese financial institutions have been
reinvested in US treasury bonds, helping the US government finance the net transfer to labor.
Thus, China’s exports and foreign reserves have contributed to the increasing net social wage in
the US. Nevertheless, quantitatively evaluating this relationship is beyond the scope of this
paper.

7. Conclusion
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In this paper, we have applied the net social wage approach to compare the welfare and taxation
regimes of China and the US. We also created a novel NSW-inspired approach to better
understand differences between redistribution in rural and urban China. While the net social
wage in the two countries exhibited similar increasing trends, it has distinct implications in the
two countries due to their own historical trajectories in the neoliberal era. In the US, the positive
and increasing net social wage reflects an ambivalent and reluctant response to the conditions of
social reproduction, whereas in China, it reflects institutional changes in the welfare state,
enacted by the Chinese state to attempt to resolve the social-reproduction crisis caused by
neoliberal reforms in the 1990s.

Despite these differences, the positive net social wage in the two largest economies of the world
implies that neoliberalism has social limits. This suggests two potentially different paths for
countries reckoning with the failures of neoliberalism. Some countries might overcome
neoliberalism by purposefully reinstating welfare state protections. Another possibility is that,
contrary to its own ideology, neoliberal policy may lead to greater reliance on the state to
subsidize an increasingly vulnerable working class, without the explicit intention of reversing
retrenchment.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1 A Comparison of Economic indicators: China vs. the US
1992
China

US

Real GDP in PPP per capita (PPP, constant 2011
international $)

1851.
32

14368.
63

Urban population (% of total population)

28.20

Household consumption (% of GDP)

2016
China/
US

China/
US

China

US

0.13

37045.
33

53631.
76

0.69

76.10

0.37

56.74

81.86

0.69

45.27

64.38

0.70

39.65

68.25

0.58

Investment (% of GDP)

31.11

19.83

1.57

42.98

20.17

2.13

Government expenditure (% of GDP)

14.39

16.08

0.89

14.39

14.22

1.01

Exports (% of GDP)

15.66

9.71

1.61

19.75

11.85

1.67

Foreign trade (% of GDP)

30.15

19.95

1.51

37.21

26.49

1.40

Top 10% income share (%) *

32.30

39.80

0.81

41.40
(2015)

47.00
(2014)

1.14

Compensation of employees (% of GDP) **

50.11

61.4

0.82

47.46

56.8

0.84

Sources: If not indicated, the data is from World Development Indicators database.
Notes:
* World Inequality Database.
** China Statistical Yearbook; AMECO.
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Table 2 A Comparison of NSW Categories: China vs. the US
US NSW Category

China NSW Category

Labor Share

(Wages of employees + Employer-paid Social Security +
Farming Income + Wages of Workers in Self-employed
units)/Personal Income
Added for China: Farming Income/Personal Income

Expenditure Group I
Social Security, Welfare, and Income Support

Social Security, Social Benefits, and Social Subsidies

Employment and Training

Included

Housing and Community Services

Urban and Rural Community Affairs
Added for China: Agriculture, Forestry, Water
Conservancy and Irrigation

Expenditure Group 2
Education

Education, Science and Technology

Health and Hospitals

Medical Care

Recreational and Cultural Activities

Culture, Sports, and Media

Energy

Lack of information

Natural Resources

Environment Protection

Postal Service

Lack of information

Transportation

Transportation

Tax Group I
Contributions for Social Insurance

Contributions for Social Insurance

Tax Group 2
Federal Income Taxes, State and Local Income Taxes

Income Taxes

Personal Property Taxes, Other Personal Property
Taxes, Taxes on Owner Occupied Housing
Miscellaneous Taxes and Fees

Property Taxes

Tax Group 3
Taxes on Production and Imports

Net Production Taxes
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Fig. 1: US & China NSW1/GDP and NSW2/GDP, 1992-2017
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Sources: The authors’ calculation. See Section 4 for details.
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Fig. 2: China Components of NSW2, 1992-2017
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Sources: The authors’ calculation. See Section 4 for details.
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Fig. 3: US Components of NSW2, 1992-2017
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Sources: The authors’ calculation. See Section 4 for details.
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Fig. 4: China Rural NSW/GDP, 1992-2017

Sources: The authors’ calculation. See Section 4 for details.

33

Fig. 5: China Urban NSW/GDP, 1992-2017

Sources: The authors’ calculation. See Section 4 for details.
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